THE PARADOX OF THE END WITHOUT END
David Vander Laan

In much of Christian thought humans are taken to have an ultimate end,
understood as the highest attainable good. Christians also anticipate “the
life everlasting.” Together these ideas generate a paradox. If the end can be
reached in a finite amount of time, some longer-lasting state will be better
still, so the purported end is not the highest good after all. But if the end is
to possess some good forever, then it will never be reached. So it seems an
everlasting being cannot have an ultimate end—a conclusion that apparently
makes human life pointless. How can the paradox be solved?

The Paradox
Much Christian thinking about the ultimate human end has followed
broadly Aristotelian lines. A thing’s ultimate end has been conceived as
its highest attainable good. It must be attainable, since only an attainable good is suitable as a goal. It is “that for which a thing is done.”1 The
end must also be the highest such good, since otherwise it would not be
the most choiceworthy good. It is, as Aristotle says, self-sufficient, i.e., it
would be superfluous to add other goods to it.
An even more central feature of Christian thought is what the Apostle’s
Creed calls “the life everlasting.” Unending life is sometimes explicitly
treated as an element or feature of the ultimate human end, as in the Westminster Larger Catechism’s characterization of “the chief and highest end
of man” as “to glorify God, and fully to enjoy him forever.”2
Taken together, however, the ultimate human end and the life ever
lasting are paradoxical. Hereafter, let’s use the word “telos” for the
ultimate human end. Suppose that the telos is a good that can be reached
in a finite period of time. For example, we might take the telos to be a
vision of the divine essence. In this case, it seems that an ongoing vision
of the divine essence would be better than a vision that one already had,
which is to say that the finitely reachable good is not the highest attainable
good after all. On the other hand, suppose that the telos cannot be reached
in a finite period; the goal is not merely to possess some good but to possess it forever. In this case, the telos will never be reached, and indeed can
1
See Physics 194b33 and also Nicomachean Ethics 1097a, where a thing’s good is characterized the same way.
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never be reached. No one can reach the end of an endless future, and so
the goal of doing anything forever is unattainable.
It looks, then, as if an everlasting being cannot have a telos. But that
conclusion will hardly seem acceptable to the Christian. If human beings
are created by God they are created with a purpose, whereas the absence
of a goal would apparently make human life pointless.
So reflection on what Augustine calls “the end without end”3 unearths
a genuine puzzle. For us his playful phrase may be an invitation to reinvestigate the character of the human future.
We may summarize the argument as follows:
(1) Each human being B is everlasting.
(2) B has a telos T only if it is possible for B to attain T.
(3) B has a telos T only if T is greater than any other good that B can
attain.
(4) If B is everlasting and B can attain T in a finite interval, then B
can attain a good greater than T.
(5) If B cannot attain T in a finite interval, then it is not possible for
B to attain T.
∴ (6) No human being has a telos.
The argument assumes no particular view of what the telos is. Whether
one thinks of the ultimate human end as an absorbing contemplation of
God, a vocation of productive activity, or a relationship of harmony with
God and all creation, the premises are prima facie true and they support a
prima facie false conclusion. I will assume, however, that a person’s telos (if
any) is a state or condition of that person, where state is a category broad
enough to include conditions that are momentary, temporally extended,
or atemporal; finite or infinite in duration; continuous or discontinuous;
static or dynamic; and intrinsic or relational. To attain a state is simply to
exemplify it or be in it.
The argument above is valid, so any attempt to resolve the paradox
must either reject one of its premises or accept its conclusion. Let’s consider some strategies. Five of them will reject one of the five premises,
and one will accept the argument’s conclusion. Each strategy will have
some disadvantages. Having considered each, I will unveil an additional
strategy that seems to me to have the best prospects.
Denying Premise (1): Atemporal Life
Premise (1): Each human being B is everlasting.

3
“There we shall rest and see, see and love, love and praise. This is what shall be in the
end without end [fine sine fine]. For what other end do we propose to ourselves than to attain
to the kingdom of which there is no end?” (The City of God, 22.30).
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Denial of (1): The Scriptural promise is of eternal life, but “eternal” can
mean “atemporal” rather than “everlasting.” After death, human beings
enter eternity, and human life will be timeless. This is consistent with attainment of the human telos, which is to enter an atemporal relation with God.4
Reply: The idea of a future atemporal state is incoherent. To be in an
atemporal state is to lack temporal properties and relations. Being later
than is a temporal relation, so no one in an atemporal state exists later than
any temporal event. It follows that no human being existing at the present
time will enter an atemporal state later than the present time. A corollary
is that it would be folly to hope for such a condition. Whatever else an
atemporal state may be, it cannot be something to look forward to.
We may also note that the present strategy is an uneasy fit with traditional Christian thinking on the topic.5 Augustine and Boethius made the
notion of an atemporal eternity a widespread feature of Christian thought,
but they reserved the notion for God. Neither suggested that atemporality
was a feature of human existence, future or otherwise.6 Aquinas does
argue that the beatific vision is “a sort of participation in eternity.” He argues, for example, on the grounds that what is seen in it is seen all at once,
its object (the divine substance) is not in time, and its agent (the intellect)
is incorruptible.7 None of these considerations, however, keep Aquinas
from concluding that the felicity gained through this vision is perpetual,
and from this it follows that it is temporal. In fact, Aquinas argues, the
felicity “would not be the ultimate end unless it endured perpetually.”8
Thus Aquinas’s case for human participation in eternity is not a denial
of premise (1). Likewise, the other major figures of the tradition ascribe
atemporal existence to God but everlasting life to human persons.
Could it be that the human future is sempiternal? Sempiternity is a condition of duration without change, and the duration, as the name suggests,
is everlasting. So the thesis of human sempiternity is not an objection to
premise (1) but an endorsement of it.
Perhaps some will be tempted to develop a non-traditional view on which
a single unchanging “moment” follows all the times of one’s fully temporal
life. To evaluate such a view we would need to see it and its motivating
arguments spelled out, but in anticipation we can see at least one problem
that would need to be overcome. Like any other static conception of the
human end, the view would stand in prima facie tension with the Christian
4
One might also deny premise (1) by claiming that some humans will cease to exist, e.g.,
with an annihilationist account of damnation, but in the end this approach has no effect. It
can be circumvented by replacing (1) with the premise that each human being is potentially
everlasting (and adjusting (4) accordingly).
5
The King James Version renders ὅτι χρόνος οὐκέτι ἔσται in Revelation 10:6 with the
phrase “that there should be time no longer,” but most contemporary English translations
have “There will be no more delay.”
6
See, e.g., Confessions, Book XI.13 and XIII.36.
7
Summa Contra Gentiles, 3.61.
8
Summa Contra Gentiles, 3.62.3.
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doctrine of resurrection. Christians anticipate an embodied afterlife, but it
is difficult to see what use a body could be in an unchanging state.9
Let’s proceed, then, on the assumption that humans will have an unending temporal existence.
Denying Premise (2): Asymptotic Approach
Premise (2): B has a telos T only if it is possible for B to attain T.
Denial of (2): It is not necessary to think that a telos must be attainable.
It can play its role as that at which human life is aimed if it can be approached asymptotically, i.e., if a human life can resemble the telos more
and more, or overlap it more and more, so as to come to come arbitrarily
close to it.
Reply: To treat the telos as unattainable would really be to replace the
notion of a telos (that is, a goal, “that for which a thing is done”) with
a guiding ideal, something that provides direction to a life without the
possibility of a final arrival. In other words, the idea that human life asymptotically approaches an unattainable state is less a denial of (2) than
an affirmation of (6). But either way, the present strategy is a departure.
If this strategy were the most promising solution, the paradox would be
noteworthy for that reason alone.10
But in fact the strategy is dubious. Suppose that human life at its best
approaches some ideal asymptotically. If the ideal were a state that could
be attained in a finite interval, there would presumably be no need merely
to approach it. So the asymptotic approach strategy assumes that the ideal
is a state that cannot be attained in a finite interval. The most salient type
of candidate is an everlasting state (e.g., loving and enjoying God forever).
But if this sort of state is the ideal, it cannot be approached asymptotically,
or indeed to any meaningful extent. However long one lives, one is no
closer to having lived forever. In an everlasting life, the ratio of the amount
time one has already lived to the amount of time one has yet to live is
always exactly zero (if we confine ourselves to the real numbers), or at
any rate less than every positive real number (if we allow infinitesimals).
One cannot be said to approach the purported ideal, asymptotically or
otherwise.

9
Christina Van Dyke raises this issue for Aquinas’s understanding of happiness. If the
body of a participant in the beatific vision performs no actions, as Aquinas apparently believed (Summa Contra Gentiles, 3.62.8), why should God raise such bodies at all? Not for doing
anything. Perhaps the most promising Thomistic answer is that the body is integral to the
identity of the human person. Whatever the detached soul may do, we ourselves will not
be the subjects of the divine vision until our bodies and souls are reunited. However, this
raises the question why God would make creatures whose fulfillment makes an integral part
useless. See Van Dyke, “Shiny Happy People.”
10
The same goes for the idea that it is enough to be in the process of moving toward an
unattainable telos without approaching it asymptotically. If the state is unattainable, then it
is not a goal. Nor can a state of being in the process of moving toward an ideal be the telos
since such a state is surpassable.. (See the discussion of premise (4) )
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So an approachable ideal cannot be having a certain good forever. But
a Zenoesque state might have a suitable structure. Suppose that a human
can be in a state S for any finite length of time, no matter how short (e.g.,
the state of existing, or of having some temporally intrinsic property).
Let D be a discontinuous interval consisting of a half-year portion of one
year, a quarter-year portion of the next year, an eighth-year portion of
the year after that, and so on. Then let Z be the state of being in S for a
full year of interval D in total. What we say next depends on what it is to
approach a state. Z would require an infinite number of days to complete,
so if approaching a state entails needing less time to complete it, Z cannot
be approached. But if approaching a state is overlapping or including
an increasing fraction of it, then Z can be approached. And because the
overlapped fraction can be arbitrarily close to 1, Z can be approached
asymptotically.
This suffices to show that there are states that can be approached
asymptotically. But what state with this feature is a plausible candidate for
the role of the ideal of human life? The suggestion that the ideal is Z (on
a suitable specification of S) or anything with a remotely similar structure
seems rather silly.
A possibility that isn’t patently ridiculous is that the ideal is the limit of
some activity or characteristic that can only be gained with diminishing
returns. For illustration, suppose that (i) the ideal is perfect adoration of
God, that (ii) the quality of one’s adoration increases with experience,
and that (iii) the extent of the gains inevitably decreases as the quality
increases. Suppose further that (iv) the rate of decrease in the gains is such
that perfect adoration cannot be reached in any finite amount of time, but
one’s adoration can come arbitrarily close to perfection. Then the ideal is
asymptotically approachable.
Again we have an abstract possibility, this time with a bit of initial plausibility. But we have not yet seen that this is in fact the correct way to think
about the human ideal. What remains for the advocate of the asymptotic
approach strategy is to identify the activity or characteristic of which the
ideal is the limit and to provide independent grounds for thinking that it
can only be gained with diminishing returns at a rate that makes the approach asymptotic. To my knowledge, this has not yet been done.
And there are reasons to doubt that it can be done. It is plausible—so
it seems to me—that the value of living as a human for a given length of
time has some positive lower bound. A day of human life cannot be utterly
without value, and human nature sets a threshold below which its value
cannot fall. But if so, the values added to a life as the days go on do not
become arbitrarily small, and so the total value of that life will eventually surpass any purported limit. At the very least, we can see that some
relatively specific theses about the ideal and the values that accrue in a life
that approaches it would need to be established to show that the idea of
asymptotic approach is viable.
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Denying Premise (3): Surpassable Happiness
Premise (3): B has a telos T only if T is greater than any other good that
B can attain.
Denial of (3): Aristotle does not treat the telos as the greatest attainable good. Admittedly, he does characterize happiness as self-sufficient,
lacking nothing. But in a number of ways his description of happiness
makes it clear that it need not be the greatest possible good. For example,
though Aristotle famously remarks that happiness is to be found in a complete life, he does not suggest that it must be the longest possible life.11 For
another example, though great changes of fortune can tarnish one’s happiness, even the happy person will experience some bad fortune.12 Since it is
presumably possible that such bad fortune be avoided, the life that makes
a person happy need not be the greatest possible.13
For these reasons we should distinguish between the greater-than relation and the done-for-the-sake-of relation, and between the orderings of
goods that these relations generate. Aristotle treats happiness as the ultimate member of the done-for-the-sake-of ordering, but implicitly denies
that happiness is the ultimate member of the greater-than ordering. So
there are principled reasons for thinking that (3) is false. We may even say
that the summum bonum is not the highest good.14
Reply: Granting the exegetical claims, it remains puzzling how one
could consistently affirm that the ultimate human end is not the greatest
attainable good. Aristotle’s own thought supplies reasons to be puzzled
about this. He says that if the complete good (i.e., the telos) were merely
one good among others, “it would clearly be more worthy of choice
with even the least good added to it. For the good added would cause
an increase in goodness, and the greater good is always more worthy of
choice.”15 This appears to imply that the complete good cannot be improved upon (i.e., that the ultimate member of the done-for-the-sake-of
ordering is not surpassed in the greater-than ordering) and that premise
(3) is true. This is the reason that a state like beginning an everlasting life of

11
Nicomachean Ethics, I.7 (1098a). Terence Irwin says that a complete life need not take a
whole lifetime, citing 1101a6–13. See Irwin’s translation (185, a note on I.7, sec. 16).
12
Nicomachean Ethics, I.10 (1100b).
13
Roger Crisp argues, “It is important to recognize here that Aristotle is not suggesting
that a life can be happy only if it is itself unimprovable. That would be absurd, since any
human life is always lacking something the addition of which would improve it. Rather,
Aristotle’s point is a conceptual constraint on any conception of happiness is that it not be
improvable by the addition of some good which it has omitted” (Nicomachean Ethics, Crisp
introduction, xii).
14
In one sense. Among medieval authors “summum bonum” often refers to God rather than
to a good that can be achieved, such as the vision of God. Cf. Aristotle’s distinction between
the Form of the Good and the kind of good that is the object of action (Nicomachean Ethics,
I.6 (1096b)).
15
Nicomachean Ethics, I.7 (1097b).
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great goods cannot be the telos, since the addition of one of the goods to
come yields a greater state.
It may be that Aristotle also provides a solution to this puzzle. He repeatedly remarks that it is inappropriate to seek more exactness than the
subject matter allows. If one regards happiness as a lifetime of virtuous activity or a state that closely resembles this, then one could arguably affirm
both that the telos is, more or less, the greatest attainable good and that
the state of one who attains the telos could be (or have been) improved.
This line of thought suggests a way in which one might regard attainment of the telos as something less than attainment of the greatest
attainable good. However, it does not provide an effective solution to the
paradox under consideration. Suppose we identified the telos with some
good that is surpassed by a similar good. In a rich and everlasting life, still
longer lasting and more inclusive goods will surpass the candidate telos
and every good that approximates it. For example, putting the virtues into
action over a normal human lifespan of seventy or eighty years is a great
and noteworthy good, but putting the virtues into action over seventy or
eighty thousand years outshines it by a wide margin.
What this shows is that even if premise (3) is false, we can repair the
argument by replacing premises (3) and (4). There are a number of ways
to do this.16 Here is one simple, serviceable replacement pair.
(3*) B has a telos T only if no other good that B can attain is much
greater than T.
(4*) If B is everlasting and B can attain T in a finite interval, then B can
attain a good much greater than T.
(3*) is a rather unassuming claim. If Aristotle is correct in saying that the
greater good is always more choiceworthy, then the telos, that for which
human actions are ultimately done, cannot be a decidedly lesser good
(even if it can be less good than one that it approximates). (4*) is also
eminently plausible, provided that an everlasting individual can always
continue to live a life of sufficient value. Christians, of course, believe the
life everlasting to be one of profound value. If the values of successive
states are straightforwardly additive (i.e., for any state A of value x and
state B of value y, the state of being first in A and then in B has the value
x + y), all that is really needed to establish (4*) is that the values of intervals of this life will never approach zero, tapering off to nothing. But even
if successive states’ values are not additive17 it is plausible (as suggested
16
For example, one could replace the word “greater” in (3) and (4) with the words “more
choiceworthy” to yield a paradox as potent as the original.
17
Apparently they are not. The enjoyment derived from the taste of food decreases quickly
after the first few bites even if the taste itself remains the same, and so the value that the state
of tasting food gets from its enjoyment also decreases. So facts about human psychology
imply that the value of goods is not invariably additive. However, the relevant psychological
facts are presumably contingent, and we should be cautious about assuming that they will
continue to be true throughout an everlasting life.

Faith and Philosophy

164

earlier) that additional states of a given duration do add a value of at least
a certain minimum, and in this case as well, adding enough of them will
yield any additional amount of value that one cares to specify.
So even if we allow that, strictly, the telos need not be the very highest
attainable good, we do not have a way out of the paradox.
Denying Premise (4): More Isn’t Better
Premise (4): If B is everlasting and B can attain T in a finite interval, then
B can attain a good greater than T.
Denial of (4): We should think of the telos as a state that requires at most
a relatively brief interval. For example, rather than saying that the telos is
the state of loving and enjoying God forever, we would do better to say
that it is the state of loving and enjoying God, adding that the redeemed
will be in this state forever. The telos is either a short-term state or a general state that does not require any particular duration.
This way of thinking about the telos is rooted in the Aristotelian tradition. Aquinas, for one, identifies the telos as the vision of the divine
essence, and he describes it as a vision that can be experienced at a given
time. A separated soul, for example, can see the divine essence prior to the
resurrection of the body.18 It need not be understood as an event spread
over centuries or an unending future. But the vision is also the highest
good, and nothing can add to its goodness.19
Reply: This strategy will only make (4) false if some short-term or general state cannot be surpassed, but this is not so. Further, it is dubious that
the telos is traditionally conceived as a short-term or general state. We can
see this as follows.
Those who have a good for a short period of time ordinarily desire
to keep it, or to acquire one that is better still. Better to be healthy for a
lifetime than healthy for a year! Similarly, those who have had a good for a
long time are typically glad to have had it for so long. Since these prospective and retrospective attitudes (and related ones like hope and gratitude)
reflect judgments about what is good, it seems that we naturally regard
the long-term possession of a good as better ceteris paribus than its shortterm possession, and in general the longer the better.20 Put in terms of
states, longer good-possession states, such as being healthy for a lifetime,
are better than the corresponding shorter states, such as being healthy for a
year.21 It follows that no such shorter state is unsurpassable, even if it is the
best possible state that can be attained in its timespan. Anyone who cares
Summa Theologiae IaIIae 4.5.
E.g., Summa Theologiae IaIIae 2.8.
20
This judgment does not imply that the values of successive states are in general additive.
21
For convenience I have used temporally neutral examples like being healthy for a year,
but there are also past states (having been healthy for a year), future states (going to be healthy
for a year), present states (being healthy now), and mixed states (having been, being, and going
to be healthy for a year in total). In such cases one attains a temporally neutral state only by
18
19
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to challenge this observation owes some explanation of what is wrong
with the ordinary judgment that more is better than less.
What of states that are not tied to any particular time frame? Being
healthy, for example, is a more general state than both being healthy for a
year and being healthy for a lifetime. Anyone who is in the state being healthy
for a year is also in the state being healthy, but not vice versa. Since it is
possible to be in such a general state without being in the best state, the
general state is not itself the best state. This, too, is confirmed by our ordinary judgments. Those who are healthy, if asked, would say that they
want to continue being that way. In a rather literal sense, general states
leave something to be desired, if only continued possession of a good already possessed.
Initially it may seem that presentism, the thesis that only what is present
exists, grounds an objection here. If momentary states (e.g., being healthy
now) and general states (e.g., being healthy) are the only states, or the only
attainable ones, then there are no longer-term states that can surpass them.
But the problem with this tack quickly becomes evident. Presentism says
that there are irreducibly tensed facts. These allow the presentist to affirm,
e.g., that it was the case that dinosaurs rule the earth and that it will be the
case that my grandchildren are thriving, even though there exist neither
dinosaurs nor grandchildren of mine. But then the presentist has ample
reason to agree that a person can be such that she has had her present
goods for a year or a lifetime, and that such a state is the type of longerterm state that the argument requires.
Both short-term and general states, then, can be surpassed and thus
are ill-suited to the role of greatest attainable good. These considerations
regarding the nature of states suffice to show that the above strategy for
denying premise (4) fails. But there is an additional theological puzzle for
Christians who may be drawn to this strategy. Put as a pointed question,
if more isn’t better, why is more always provided? God gives ongoing
life as a gift, but it would be a strange gift that did not leave the recipient
better off.
As for the traditional conception of the telos, the case that it is a shortterm or general state is mixed at best. Aristotle concludes that the complete
good is virtuous activity over a complete life, not simply virtuous activity.
Though he may not assume that more is better without exception, as
discussed above, he says clearly that a short time is not enough for happiness.22 Even Aquinas’s way of thinking about the duration of the telos
seems flexible. Here is the argument from Summa Contra Gentiles mentioned earlier:
Again, the intellectual creature does not reach his ultimate end until his
natural desire comes to rest. But, just as one naturally desires felicity, so also
completing the relevant time period while possessing the relevant good, i.e., by attaining the
corresponding past state.
22
Nicomachan Ethics I.7.
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does he naturally desire everlasting felicity; for, since he is everlasting in his
substance, he desires to possess forever that object which is desired for its
own sake and not because of something else. Therefore, his felicity would
not be the ultimate end unless it endured perpetually.23

Perhaps “felicity” names a short-term state, so that “everlasting felicity”
names something like a compound of many such states. Or perhaps “felicity” names a general state, so that “everlasting felicity” names a specific
sort of felicity. But even if “felicity” itself does not name an everlasting state,
the conclusion gives us reason to think that Aquinas identifies the telos—
here, at least—with everlasting felicity rather than felicity simpliciter.24
Denying Premise (5): Attainable Everlastingness
Premise (5): If B cannot attain T in a finite interval, then it is not possible
for B to attain T.
Denial of (5): We may grant that a goal of doing something forever will
not and cannot be attained at any future time since at each time there will
always be more time to come. Nonetheless, we can see that (5) is false by
considering this argument:
		

(7) God promises everlasting life.

		

(8) Everlasting life cannot be attained.

Thus (9) God’s promise must fail.
The conclusion is unacceptable and the first premise is true, so everlasting
life must be attainable in some way. There are at least two possibilities.
One posits an atemporal sense of “attain,” and the other what we may call
an infinitary sense of “attain.”
The atemporal sense is most natural in the context of four-dimensionalism, according to which future events exist as fully as present events
do, or in the context of an atemporal, divine standpoint from which temporal events can be seen. A state is attained in this sense if its instantiation
belongs to the existing future (or present or past) of the world, or if its
instantiation is present in its entirety to God. So on the assumption of

Summa Contra Gentiles, 3.62.3.
Though this is not the place for a full examination of Aquinas’s account of the ultimate end, one difficulty is worth noting here. Resurrection, it would seem, is a great good.
However, the visio dei, which can be reached before resurrection, is the ultimate end, and
so no further good can improve the condition of one who has it. When discussing what is
necessary for happiness (Summa Theologiae IaIIae 4.5–6), Aquinas makes a distinction. The
body is not necessary for the vision of the divine essence (art. 5) but perfection of the body
is necessary for “that happiness which is in all ways perfect” (art. 6). Presumably resurrection is needed for the latter but not the former. But if the vision of the divine essence
and “that happiness which is in all ways perfect” are distinct states, as they must be, the
latter is the better of the two. This contradicts Aquinas’s identification of the telos with the
former.
23

24
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four-dimensionalism or atemporalism it is correct to say that it is possible
for a person to attain an everlasting life.
The infinitary sense gives us a similar result with fewer metaphysical
assumptions.25 To motivate the idea, consider the goal of being faithful to
your spouse “till death do you part.” It is not possible to accomplish this
goal at any time prior to the death that comes first, though it is possible to
accomplish it with lifelong persistence. Now suppose that you and your
spouse will both live forever, and that your goal is to be faithful forever.26
Again, it is not possible to accomplish this goal at any time in medias res.
But the goal is still attainable, since you may indeed continue to be faithful
without fail.
Reply: Not everyone will agree that there is an atemporal sense of
“attain” with a true application. Some theists reject both four-dimensionalism and divine atemporality and hold that purportedly tenseless verbs
must be equivalent to disjunctively tensed verbs.27 “Attain” must mean
“did attain, now attains, or will attain.” If this is what the atemporal sense
amounts to, then premise (5) remains true, since it is not possible that a
human being will attain (or has attained or is attaining) the requisite state.
Even if we grant that there is an atemporal sense of “attain,” though,
there remains the question whether it is possible that an end be attainable in this sense alone. Suppose there were a mountain of infinite height
and some intrepid mountaineer set out to climb all of it. He imagines the
satisfaction that would come with accomplishing his lofty objective, the
accolades of his peers. Can we allow that this is an attainable goal? Or is
it rather like the illusory goal of those amateur mathematicians who set
out to trisect an arbitrary angle using only a straightedge and compass?28
If the mountaineer’s goal is to come to the end of an endless task, the goal
is ill conceived.
There may be a God’s-eye view from which an endless task is, in a
manner of speaking, completed, but it is not clear that attainment of this
atemporal sort could properly motivate human action or ground hope,
which is a future-oriented attitude. Any temporal being pursuing an
endless task would have to acknowledge that the goal has not yet been
reached and that this will always be so. In this respect the case of the intrepid
mountaineer resembles the myth of Sisyphus, the archetypal image of futility and pointlessness.
What this indicates is that an atemporal sense of “attain” is of no use in
escaping the paradox of the end without end. The straightforward, temporal sense of “attain”—the one that is at work in the thought that an end

25
The term “infinitary” suggests an analogy with infinitary logics, which may allow infinitely long proofs of conclusions that cannot be proved in a finite number of steps.
26
Lara Buchak and John Pittard independently suggested this case.
27
See, for example, Wolterstorff, “God and Time.”
28
See Dudley, A Budget of Trisections.
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must be attainable—makes the premises in which it appears true, and this
sense is what generates the paradox.
The infinitary sense of “attain” has the same problem and another besides. The case of the everlasting marriage suggests something like this
definition. For a person P, a state S is attainable in the infinitary sense iff (a)
S is equivalent to being in state S* forever, and (b) it is possible for P to be
in state S* forever (i.e., at all times after some time t). Working backward,
a person P attains a state S in the infinitary sense iff (a) S is equivalent to
being in state S* forever, and (b) P will be in state S* forever (i.e., at all
times after some time t). Note that the future tense in the second clause
of the definiens is needed. A present tense verb would render the clause
incoherent, since at no single time can something be in a state forever,
and an atemporal verb would make the infinitary sense another atemporal
sense. So to attain a state in the sense of this definition is to have a certain
kind of future.
Such a definition does not succeed in specifying a sense of “attain” that
makes premise (5) false. It does make the consequent false; with suitable
choices of B and T, it is possible for B to have the requisite kind of future.
But since it is possible that B now has that kind of future, the antecedent is
false as well, and so premise (5) is true.
In that case, what is the best solution to the promise puzzle? I will not
attempt a detailed treatment of the logic of promises and future tense
propositions here, but I will briefly suggest that the first premise of the
promise argument needs to be disambiguated. Surely God does not
promise the completion of an impossible task, reaching the end of an
endless future. The promise of everlasting life to John, say, is rather the
assurance that the duration of John’s life has no upper bound. If (7) is so
taken, (7) and (8) do not appear to imply (9), and the argument does not
motivate the denial of (5).
Defending the Conclusion: Epektasis
Conclusion: No human being has a telos.
Defense of the conclusion: Though there is an august tradition of Christian thought that regards human life as aimed toward a highest attainable
good, there is a noteworthy dissenting opinion as well. Gregory of Nyssa
uses the word “epektasis” for the soul’s ascent to God. The central theme of
his account is that this ascent is perpetual progress. It is “forgetting what
is behind and straining toward what is ahead”29 and not a final arrival or
accomplishment. Gregory describes it as progress in love, growth toward
the better, participation in the infinite Good, and tireless desire for divine
beauty. The process is brought about by the Word’s repeated call to the
soul, which attracts it and gives it both the desire and the strength for the
next stage of the ascent.
29

Philippians 3:13.
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Gregory does not develop this account as a solution to the paradox of
the end without end. He does not engage Aristotle’s views directly or (so
far as I can discern) discuss the notion of a telos. The foundation of his
view is the infinite nature of God and the human capacity to bear the divine image through unlimited growth. But epektasis does provide us a way
of framing the rejection of a telos. There is no highest good for humans
since each good is surpassed by another, more inclusive good.
Reply: Notice first that it won’t work to say that the human telos is to
continue growing in goodness forever. That answer would face the same
problem as any other answer that identifies the telos as acting in some
way forever. Such an end would be unattainable, and a telos must be attainable. If the idea of epektasis were to furnish us with a solution to the
paradox along these lines, it would have to involve a rejection of premise
(2) or (5), and we have already seen the difficulties that these routes
encounter.
It is better to interpret epektasis as above, that is, as a rejection of the
assumption that there is a human telos.30 But it also seems untenable to
deny outright that humans have a telos. In the Christian story, a wise and
provident God created humans; they are intended for something. How
can that be so without a target or destination? It is natural to say of a
roadside accretion of garbage, say, that it lacks a telos. It is an unintended
by-product, not something that was deliberately created for a purpose.
Human life cannot be like this. If the present strategy is to be a satisfying
one, we need some further explanation of how human life can lack a telos
but differ from the products of mere happenstance.
Fortunately, there is more that can be said.
Defending the Conclusion: An Infinity of Ends
Another defense of the conclusion: There is no single human telos that is
the highest attainable good. Rather, there are an infinite number of human
ends, each attainable, but none the highest. Like all attainable ends, each
of them can be accomplished in a finite interval of time. Though it has no
telos, human life is teleological. It is unlike a pile of garbage in that it has
ends, and indeed an infinite number of them. Not only that, but each end
will be attained at some time, so on this view everlasting life is a life of
fulfillment. In contrast, if the only end were infinitely distant, everlasting
life would be a life of deferment.
The infinity-of-ends strategy does not specify to what degree the ends
differ from each other. It would be consistent with this view to assert that
each of the ends differs radically from each of the others. This approach
might take its inspiration from Gregory’s emphasis on the infinite nature
30
In The Life of Moses Gregory writes, “It is therefore undoubtedly impossible to attain perfection, since, as I have said, perfection is not marked off by limits” (I.8). However, he later
goes on to write, “For the perfection of human nature consists perhaps in its very growth
in goodness” (I.10). See also “Epektasis” in The Brill Dictionary of Gregory of Nyssa, where
Gregory is understood to reject a telos or term in human perfection.
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of God. But it would also be consistent with this view to assert that the
ends are quite similar to each other. It could even accommodate a static
conception of the afterlife like Aquinas’s with the claim that for each positive real number n, one of the ends is seeing the divine essence for n days.
Before we consider objections, notice first that the infinity-of-ends
strategy must be employed with some care. If someone asked why God
would create beings who were by nature directed toward an infinity of
ends, there are some plausible general answers we might give. God wanted
creatures who would bear his own inexhaustible image, we might say, or
God wanted creatures to be the recipients of unending generosity. But as
soon as the infinite array of ends is subsumed under some overarching
goal, the solution to the paradox is lost. The overarching goal is the good
that makes the other ends worthwhile, so it is the ultimate end. And since
its fulfillment requires an eternity to complete, it is unattainable. So if the
infinity-of-ends strategy is to succeed, we must carefully avoid saying that
the many ends all serve a single, overarching goal.
Now we can see the first objection, viz., that recognizing an overarching
goal is inevitable. Perhaps one of the general answers to the question about
God’s reasons for creating humans is true. But in any case we can consider
the conjunctive end whose conjuncts are the infinity of attainable ends.
The conjunctive end is, of course, a greater good than any of the conjuncts.
If a person has each attainable end, then as a matter of logic he or she has
the conjunctive end, too.31
The flaw in this objection is its final step. It does not follow that a
person has the conjunctive end since the class of ends is not closed under
conjunction. Theists in particular have reasons to deny closure, since they
may well identify the natural ends of a creature as goods that the creator
intends the creature to have. If this is correct, ends behave like intentions;
the class of ends is closed only if the class of end-conferring intentions is
closed. And this is doubtful. It does not simply follow from P intends E1
and P intends E2 that P intends E1 & E2 (where E1 & E2 is a single, conjunctive state). I might intend to arrive at home by five o’clock and also intend
see Jerusalem someday, but it does not follow that I intend to arrive at
home by five o’clock and see Jerusalem someday, a state of affairs that
may never occur to me. Nor does God’s perfect rationality or omniscience
entail that the class of God’s intentions is closed under conjunction. God
may intend each of two states independently, foreseeing but not intending
their conjunction. In general, closure fails because of the intender’s ability
to identify and select a state as a goal without selecting what it (perhaps
with other states) entails. In the case of human ends, God has good reason
to refrain from selecting the conjunctive end. The reason is by this time
familiar: the conjunctive end is unattainable. So one who believes in an
infinity of ends is not forced to recognize a single, overarching end.

31

Cf. Summa Theologiae IaIIae 1.5.
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One final worry32: The future outlined in the infinity-of-ends strategy
might seem inadequate in comparison with the traditional, Aristotelian
conception of an ultimate end that brings all desire to rest. On the infinityof-ends strategy there will always be desires that are as yet unsatisfied.
Shouldn’t we prefer an understanding of human beatitude that entails
perfect satisfaction rather than partial satisfaction?
Of course, it is not a question of what we would prefer, but of what the
future actually holds, and we have seen reasons to think that any state that
satisfies all desires at once is illusory. An everlasting person who is aware
of at least some future goods and who desires some future goods of which
she is aware will have some desires that are not yet satisfied. “Partial”
satisfaction is not a substandard condition, but the natural condition of essentially temporal persons. In fact, the very beatitude of such a person will
entail a future of great goods, and it will exclude both complete advance
ignorance of them and complete indifference to them. So everlasting persons should regard the satisfaction of all desires at once not as a goal but
as a state incompatible with their beatitude.33
Furthermore, a state in which desires for the future are not yet met can
be an immensely valuable one, both in the experience of its bearer and
objectively. We see this to a degree in the current human condition, and
we should expect it all the more when at last sorrow and sighing have
fled. As to experience, unsatisfied desire does not imply dissatisfaction in
a psychological sense. We all know that it is possible to look toward future
goods with joyful anticipation. As to objective value, an ongoing life of
increasing goods is compatible with the kinds of goods traditionally associated with an ultimate end (e.g., knowledge and love and enjoyment of
God34), as well as many others that have been claimed for human beatitude
(e.g., the activity of praise, the power of bodily movement, honor, freedom
of the will, intellectual knowledge, and rest;35 beauty, swiftness and endurance of the body, health, quenching of hunger and thirst, melody, wisdom,
friendship, concord, power, riches, security, and delight in the blessedness
of loved ones and of God36).
The paradox of the end without end prompts us to consider what kind
of final hope is available to naturally temporal creatures, those whose
being is spread out over time. Both at first glance and upon examination,
the argument appears to show that there is no highest attainable good in
an unending life, and so the notion of an ultimate end is problematic from
a Christian perspective. Nevertheless, by positing an infinite number of
32
For the present. Aquinas’s discussion of whether human life has a single last end (ST
IaIIae 1.4), for one, deserves a more thorough response than this initial exploration allows.
33
Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, The Life of Moses, I.5–10. See also The Brill Dictionary of Gregory
of Nyssa: “Infinite perfection consists in immutability; in man’s case, perfection consists in
stability which is given precisely through the stability of a constant progress in growth.”
34
See, for example, Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IaIIae 1.8, 5.2.
35
Augustine, The City of God, 22.30.
36
Anselm, Proslogium, 25.
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ends we can explain how the premises of the argument may be both true
and consistent with a life of everlasting fulfillment.37
Westmont College
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